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Talk the talk, or walk the walk? Changing narratives in Europeanisation research  
Timofey Agarin & Gözde Yilmaz, Queen’s University Belfast & Atilim University 
Ankara 
Over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in 
‘Europeanisation’, both within and beyond the European Union (EU). The 
impact of Eastern enlargement in 2004 on both accession and neighbourhood 
states has attracted scholarly attention, and a consensus currently exists on the 
success of the EU’s transformative power through employing a conditionality 
mechanism. However, the limits of EU conditionality upon accession countries, 
neighbourhood ‘Europeanisation’, in addition to the problems experienced by 
the EU itself have brought into the question whether the end of Europeanisation 
research is in sight. Considering this, we critically evaluate the issues discussed 
in the scholarship on Europeanisation and review several points of interest in 
relation to EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
 
The ‘Europeanisation’ phenomenon has affected the whole of Europe over the past two 
decades, from European Union (EU) member states to candidate states, and later to  
neighbourhood states, and beyond. Whereas a decade ago, it was widely believed that 
the EU had successfully exported sets of norms and values, rules and policies into its 
neighbourhood, political developments in the Middle East and North Africa region 
(MENA), to the East of the EU and most recently in the EU itself have caused many 
scholars to wonder whether past views of the Union as an attractive point of reference 
have been rather exaggerated. As the EU struggles with many crises, ranging from 
Greek to Ukrainian, Eurozone to Turkish, refugee to refugee populist – scholars have 
increasingly drawn attention to the decreasing capacity of the Union to pay attention to 
countries in its immediate neighbourhood1. If anything, debates over the past decade 
doubt the ability of the EU’s own institutions to implement necessary economic and 
political reforms in its own member-states, and as such indicate the limits of the EU’s 
transformative power outside its borders.  
There is considerable purchase to this argument among contemporary policy 
communities in many EU member and candidate countries, but also among lay publics 
and academics studying the processes of Europeanisation. Indeed, since the  
introduction of the term, ‘Europeanisation’ has come to mean many things: from 
policies applied in candidate countries in the run-up to enlargement, to specific 
frameworks, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), facilitating change in 
polities. In parallel to the process of Eastern enlargement of the EU, academic debates 
on ‘accession’ and ‘neighbourhood’ Europeanisation evolved into separate research 
fields. More recently, the scholarship which had dealt with the Europeanisation of 
member-states has refocussed upon its effect upon accession countries, contributing to 
the proliferation of research on a gamut of policies and politicking. This expanding and 
                                                 
1 Federica Bicchi, “The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab 
Spring: ‘More for More’ or Less of the Same?,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (September 2, 2014): 
318–32, doi:10.1080/13629395.2014.959758. 
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sub-dividing research area usually relies on the concept of Europeanisation throughout, 
but evidence that it is being used reflectively is scant. Simultaneously, evidence that 
progress in the field has been hampered by this lack of reflection is growing. Centrally, 
we contend that the focus on policies and political processes in case studies has 
neglected the critical role the political institutions of states play in facilitating as well as 
in amortising the impact of European institutions. We therefore are suggesting that 
despite much of the talk, very few scholars have actually committed to ‘walk the walk’ 
of Europeanisation and focus their attention on the impact domestic institutions have on 
European organisations’ capacity to effect domestic change in individual states.  
To explore when, how and why the scholarship ended up in this situation, we trace the 
origins of the research on Europeanisation, starting from contemporary concerns about 
domestic issues on Europeanisation, back to concerns about supranational inputs into 
domestic matters during the 1990s enlargement process. The preliminary conclusion we 
draw from this survey is that while in some areas of the scholarship Europeanisation 
research has gathered less clout than deserved, it has built up repute in other areas 
where it deserves far less attention.  
 
Between the real world process and object of research   
Since the first mention of the term ‘Europeanisation’ in the sense of ‘adjusting to 
Europe’, much has been written using the term2. Regardless of the extreme diversity in 
this field, conclusive results on what Europeanisation is and, even more so on how it 
works are few and far between. Europeanisation studies is a ‘broad church’ with sub-
groups of scholars focussing on the incorporation of European rules, norms and values 
into the domestic arenas in a host of states: in old and new member states, future and 
contemporary candidate countries, as well as in states of the European neighbourhood. 
If anything, this demonstrates the conceptually untidy use of ‘Europeanisation’ as an 
outcome of supranational steering processes on domestic policies in states with above 
average exposure to EU pressures. Remarkably, whereas Schimmelfennig originally 
proposed to deploy ‘Europeanisation’ as a tool for explaining the ‘real’ impact of EU 
membership on domestic change in candidate countries, today’s understanding among 
the scholars is no longer limited to the direct impact of the EU3.  
The latest research relies on ‘Europeanisation’ not as a tool for explaining the top-down 
incentives for change, but rather for exploring the degree of domestic alignment in 
politics, policies and politicking with the ‘European standard’. The process of political 
change in EU accession and neighbouring countries brought about by ‘adjusting to 
Europe’ has created different perceptions on the ground about the ‘Europe’ itself. This 
                                                 
2 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 32, no. 1 (March 1, 1994): 69–88, doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5965.1994.tb00485.x; Stanley Henig, “The Europeanisation of British Politics,” in Trends in British 
Politics since 1945 (Springer, 1978), 181–193. 
3 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80. 
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at times has led to indirect changes in political preferences, political elites’ relationships 
with their societies and of societies themselves that have moved into unanticipated 
directions and at different speeds. Yet more often than not it is the indirect and 
unlooked-for impact of future changes in polities that is reflected in the studies of the 
role domestic actors increasingly play when it comes to the Europeanisation of their 
own states. It is unsurprising therefore, that the focus on the direct and limited effects of 
EU involvement that were in high currency a decade ago are no longer en vogue. 
The prior focus of Europeanisation debates on the top-down impact that international 
institutions had on domestic political developments has at the present juncture yielded 
space to concerns over alternative tools for driving domestic change. Many have also 
been blinded by ideological visions of European organisations as force for positive 
change, with little depth in assessment of the nature that that change might assume once 
Europeanisation pressures abate4. The recent heightened awareness about the impact 
domestic institutions and actors have exercised in the process of the approximation of 
national policies and political process to (perceived) European ones only further 
demonstrate how ‘Europeanisation’ is an emotive rather than a factual point of 
reference.  
The underlying normative understanding of ‘Europeanisation’ is omnipresent in the 
study of the (notional) impact of ‘Europe’ on member-states, candidate and 
neighbourhood countries. These reproduce the discourse on the positive and irreversible 
impact on domestic policy and political choices of Europeanisation. In this context, the 
recent trend to engage with bottom-up Europeanisation is evident in the literature. This 
is particularly the case with studies of Turkey, which stress the influence domestic 
factors have on dynamic change (or absence thereof), especially since the EU has been 
showing dwindling interest in this country’s accession5. It remains unclear whether 
‘domestic’ rather than ‘supranational’ factors are driving reforms outside the EU, in 
particular as regards Turkey, but also in Ukraine and the wider MENA region. 
However, these factors are often challenged in discussions on the de-Europeanisation of 
                                                 
4 Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Encounters with Europe: Concepts, Definitions, and 
Research Design,” 2006, https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/24315. 
5 Alper Kaliber, “Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey,” 
International Relations 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 52–73, doi:10.1177/0047117812455352; Beken 
Saatçioğlu, “De-Europeanisation in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of Law,” South European Society and 
Politics 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 133–46, doi:10.1080/13608746.2016.1147994; Başak Alpan, “From 
AKP’s ‘Conservative Democracy’ to ‘Advanced Democracy’: Shifts and Challenges in the Debate on 
‘Europe,’” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 15–28, 
doi:10.1080/13608746.2016.1155283. 
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Turkey6, but also of backsliding7 and lack of progress in the accession of Macedonia 
and Bosnia8. 
These approaches, grappling with sets of complex and interdependent changes in 
domestic politics, are solidly grounded in the literature on changing forms of 
governance before accession; they have also spawned (and subsequently promoted) 
studies of ‘diffusion mechanisms’. For example, Börzel and Risse, as well as Jetschke 
and Lenz all focus on Europeanisation as a process of diffusion, comprising both direct 
and indirect transformations in the polities they study.9 However, while this empirically 
rich research maps vectors of domestic change onto the potential expectations of the EU 
from member-states, much of this research suffers from insufficient theoretical 
grounding of the causalities observed. At times, political change is promulgated by the 
domestic, at others by supranational actors (as indirect mechanisms involving change), 
while in other instances changes are initiated by representatives of domestic institutions 
as in the case of indirect mechanisms of diffusion10. Although empirically insightful, 
such explanations should not be seen as analytically inspired studies of a 
Europeanisation process as they are useful for what they are: post-factum descriptions 
of outcomes.  
Similarly, another focus of research has been on domestic governance processes as 
alternatives to European conditionality11. In part, the reference to the spatial dependency 
of countries undergoing similar interactions with the EU and among each other has been 
brought up in debates on both accession and neighbourhood Europeanisation in the past. 
In focussing on illustrative analogies, such as the ‘regatta principle’ (i.e. candidate 
states’ competition with each other in the race to EU membership), or ‘competitive 
learning’ (i.e. a candidate’s engagement with the enlargement process), these studies 
                                                 
6 Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “De-Europeanisation through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP’s 
Election Speeches,” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 45–58, 
doi:10.1080/13608746.2016.1147717. 
7 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic 
Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, 
no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 105–21, doi:10.1111/jcms.12082. 
8 M. Soberg, “The Quest for Institutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” East European Politics 
and Societies 22, no. 4 (2008): 714–37; Nevena Nancheva and Cvete Koneska, “Europeanization Without 
Europe: The Curious Case of Bulgarian–Macedonian Relations,” European Politics and Society 16, no. 2 
(April 3, 2015): 224–40, doi:10.1080/23745118.2014.996325. 
9 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union’s Approaches to 
Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective,” in Democracy Promotion in the US and the EU 
Compared, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 34–60; Anja 
Jetschke and Tobias Lenz, “Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for the Study of 
Regional Organizations,” Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 4 (April 1, 2013): 626–37, 
doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.762186; Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europeanisation Meets 
Diffusion: Exploring New Territory,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2012): 192–207. 
10 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction,” West European 
Politics 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 5, doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.631310. 
11 Sandra Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration 
beyond Conditionality?,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 938–55; Sandra Lavenex 
and Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance?,” Democratization 18, no. 4 (August 1, 2011): 885–909, 
doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.584730; Frank Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization beyond Europe,” 2009. 
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place emphasis on choices made by domestic political elites in existing domestic 
institutional contexts12. Similar references to the impact of external illiberal actors on 
domestic political choices as powerful breaks for democracy promotion13 drag attention 
away from the role of the EU and its institutions in the process of ‘Europeanisation’14.  
In this context, we find studies of sectoral cooperation between the EU and 
neighbourhood countries that are linked to formalised European frameworks for direct 
and indirect democracy promotion. This segment of the contemporary Europeanisation 
literature usually stands apart from comparative regionalism studies with a specific 
focus on the EU.15 And yet, both engage with processes of transformation in non-EU 
states that are geared towards either by sets of domestic factors, or by means of external 
incentives to converge with the norms of the so-called ‘European model’ of 
governance 16 . Such an understanding of Europeanisation in both the ‘diffusion 
literature’, and in the regional-focussed research explains the transformation towards a 
more ‘European model’, explicitly as an outcome by tapping various – in part unrelated 
– factors. Such a broad understanding of ‘Europeanisation’ shows the powerful appeal 
of the term as a substitute for a toolbox containing multiple explanatory paradigms, but 
one which rarely sets out the conditions for, or indeed the timeframes of the concept’s 
effectiveness in individual case studies. It appears, therefore, that more recent changes 
in Turkey, the lack of progress on the road to Europe in Ukraine, and the stalled 
progress of accession for Western Balkan countries should result in a comprehensive 
revision of the uses of Europeanisation: This may either involve greater attention to 
discourses constitutive of the social and political reality in accession and candidate 
countries, or towards a self-referential discourse that masks the lack of progress made in 
real-world politics. 
All of this gives past research a distinct civilizational tinge that posits domestic factors 
as obstacles for domestic change, and international involvement as a driver for domestic 
alignment with the EU and its pivotal member-states. 17  Much of the resultant 
scholarship has engaged in counterfactual reasoning on actor strategies in the domestic 
politics of accession and candidate states, despite successfully disentangling core 
                                                 
12 e.g. Tobias Böhmelt and Tina Freyburg, “Diffusion of Compliance in the ‘Race towards Brussels?’ A 
Spatial Approach to EU Accession Conditionality,” West European Politics 38, no. 3 (May 4, 2015): 
601–26, doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.943523. 
13 See the volume Thomas Risse and Nelli Babayan, “Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of 
Illiberal Regional Powers: Introduction to the Special Issue,” Democratization 22, no. 3 (April 16, 2015): 
381–99, doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.997716. 
14 Julia Langbein, “European Union Governance towards the Eastern Neigbourhood: Transcending or 
Redrawing Europe’s East–West Divide?,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 1 (January 
1, 2014): 157–74, doi:10.1111/jcms.12083; Natalia Timuş, “Democracy for Export: The Europeanisation 
of Electoral Laws in the East European Neighbourhood,” East European Politics 29, no. 3 (September 1, 
2013): 289–304, doi:10.1080/21599165.2013.807803. 
15 Jetschke and Lenz, “Does Regionalism Diffuse?” 
16 Dirk Lehmkuhl, “Some Promises and Pitfalls of Europeanization Research - Springer,” 348, accessed 
August 16, 2016, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230584525_25. 
17 Thomas Risse, “‘ Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 
54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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explanatory domestic factors from domestic perceptions of loosely defined European 
norms.18 It seems that despite bottom-up as well as the so-called ‘bottom-up-down’ 
process-tracing and careful analysis of reasoning put forward by domestic actors, many 
scholars have engaged with discourses on Europeanisation, rather than with 
Europeanisation proper.  
The period of the EU’s Eastern enlargement laid the groundwork for expediting the 
differentiation between the discourses on Europeanisaton and its real-world impacts on 
a wide range of research outputs exploring the (then perceived to be real) effects of the 
EU on candidate countries. During this period of time, the theme of ‘Eastern 
enlargement’ emerged as a distinct sub-field of the ‘Europeanisation of candidate 
countries’, 19  although at all times building upon the earlier work on ‘membership 
Europeanisation’. While usefully, Europeanisation during the period of Eastern 
enlargement demonstrated vividly that some of the past trends related to the differential 
impact of the EU on accession countries were still valid, the focus lay squarely on the 
impact of conditionality in the East of Europe.20  
The literature on Eastern accession Europeanisation research has relied heavily on top-
down, EU-driven adaptation pressures while treating domestic factors such as 
adjustment costs, the role of veto players and support from the domestic opposition as 
change-hindering intervening variables.21 Much of this scholarship relied on research 
designs that undervalued the intervening domestic conditions as either positive, or 
negative factors in adopting the rationale of the EU. Rarely have domestic factors been 
viewed as facilitating change outside the narrowly prescriptive EU framework for 
institutional readjustment. Although accurate to a degree, this research has overrated the 
ability of the EU to enforce top-down change while being culpable of neglecting 
alternative routes to desired outcomes of policy change in the run-up to EU 
membership22. 
                                                 
18 Markus Haverland, “Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in 
Europeanisation Research,” West European Politics 29, no. 1 (2006): 134–46; Lehmkuhl, “Some 
Promises and Pitfalls of Europeanization Research - Springer”; Paolo R Graziano, “From Local 
Partnerships to Regional Spaces for Politics? Europeanization and EU Cohesion Policy in Southern 
Italy,” Regional & Federal Studies 20, no. 3 (2010): 315–33; Vivien A. Schmidt and Claudio M. 
Radaelli, “Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” West 
European Politics 27, no. 2 (2004): 183–210. 
19 Ulrich Sedelmeier, Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States (CONNEX / NEWGOV, 
2011), 217, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3115/. 
20 Tanja A. Börzel et al., “Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply with European 
Law,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 11 (2010): 1363–90; Heather Grabbe, The EU’s 
Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); James Hughes, “‘Exit’ in Deeply Divided Societies: Regimes 
of Discrimination in Estonia and Latvia and the Potential for Russophone Migration,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 739–69. 
21 Milada Anna Vachudova, “EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of 
Enlargement Ten Years On,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 1 (2014): 122–138, 
doi:10.1111/jcms.12081. 
22 Caitríona Carter and Romain Pasquier, “The Europeanization of Regions as ‘Spaces for Politics’: A 
Research Agenda,” Regional & Federal Studies 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 295–314, 
doi:10.1080/13597566.2010.484565; Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, “Legacies and 
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In contrast to the aforementioned trend in the literature at the time, a few adopted 
alternative perspectives to demonstrate the independent impact of the ‘domestic’ on the 
(still ill-defined) outcomes of Europeanisation, such as voluntary forms of policy 
emulation in accession states23. Despite the fact that the most peculiar cases in the 
Eastern European accession process ‘lay at the borderline between domestic choice and 
EU-induced rule adoption’24, the transformative power of Europe has remained the 
dominant theme.  
The pull of the EU on countries with favourable domestic political conditions has been 
of interest to the largest section of the scholarship25. Only time will tell if, in the 
aftermath of the current multiple European crises, this scholarship has also exploited 
‘the European factor’ as a deus ex machina for the literature at large26. For example, 
Radaelli27 has suggested that so little of the EU’s agency in the process of domestic 
change has led to biased accounts of it as a result of the downgrading of domestic 
factors to hindering (yet at all times, unsystematic) interventions.  
While both ‘membership’ and ‘accession’ Europeanisation literatures demonstrated the 
transformative power that the EU can have on domestic politics, the extent of domestic 
change has remained differential, indicating that more attention should have been paid 
to institutional changes ahead of EU accession. As such, cases which have considered 
the role domestic factors have played in the process of change have remained scarce 
and, in our view, neglectful of one central theme in the real-life changes often perceived 
to represent the same package of Europeanisation processes: the process of state-
building in accession countries.  
In fact, this very notion has been obscured by parallel societal processes across the 
wider European region. As social pressures mounted on national political elites to align 
domestic practices with those observed (usually, from afar) in the EU member-states, 
the reference to the Europeanisation of public spaces has entered public debate. In the 
aftermath of the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, the contestation of political 
representation in the aftermath of Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution and the multiple 
popular mass protests in the Western Balkans, copious reference to ‘Europeanisation’ 
has been made. In these instances, the publics of the ‘lesser consolidated democracies’ 
                                                                                                                                               
Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 62, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 443–60, doi:10.1080/09668131003647820. 
23 Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
24 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 25. 
25 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of Institutional 
Change after EU Accession,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2012): 20–38; Judith G. Kelley, 
“International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by 
International Institutions,” International Organization 58, no. 3 (2004): 425–57. 
26 Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, “Challenges of a New Research Agenda,” in Europeanization, 
ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 16, 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-230-58452-5_1. 
27 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanization: The Challenge of Establishing Causality,” in Research Design 
in European Studies, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), 5, 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137005090_1. 
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waiting in the accession queue voiced demands for greater direct involvement of the EU 
in domestic political processes. However, as can still be observed in the case of 
Macedonia’s Colourful Revolution, public outrage has so far not resulted in speedier 
EU accession processes, nor in the anticipated change of the political direction of travel.  
Popular demand for tighter EU controls over domestic political elites have, however, 
resulted in the growing interest of the EU itself in promoting and emphasising the 
importance of civil society as a pivotal stakeholder in the process28. Yet, the direct 
influence of the EU in candidate and neighbourhood countries has been limited and 
came, yet again, to signify the potential for European organisations to pressure 
policymakers in accession countries not via ‘carrots and sticks’ but through oversight by 
grassroots organisations. As a result, we increasingly see scholarly studies on the 
Europeanisation of civil society as tools that facilitate people-to-people networks in 
support of societal transformations, and usher in grounds for political change in the 
medium-term. Yet, this scholarly debate takes grassroots understandings of and 
demands for the (perceived) European rules and policies seriously, and not the sets of 
still ill-defined European norms as their analytical tools. 
From the start, the EU’s initiatives towards its neighbours have been subject to criticism 
on a variety of grounds, but mainly referring to the inherent weakness of top-down 
policy delivery. This has contributed to partial and selective analyses of the reasons for 
the successes and failures of reforms on the ground, in both member-states and 
accession states, and presently also in neighbourhood countries29. These have reflected 
the increasingly complex nature of the EU itself, but also of the decisions and crucially 
policymaking processes in the states targeted by the Union proper.  
 
Taking stock of Europeanisation research   
Looking back over two decades of Europeanisation research, the 2004 enlargement 
round has been a watershed in the scholarship: While the growing number of EU 
member-states has been of help for theorising different vectors in the EU and its 
member-states’ choices, the assessment of the toolbox of policy preferences and their 
differential outcomes across countries and issue areas has become much vaguer. For 
instance, the recent analyses by Borzel demonstrate convincingly that governments in 
the Southern Caucasus have effectively instrumentalised the EU’s own priorities and 
only selectively adopted reform packages that could be adjusted to their domestic 
                                                 
28 Bicchi, “The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring,” 324. 
29 Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen, “One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals: Cohesiveness 
and Consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 7 
(August 9, 2014): 1033–49, doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.912147; Tanja Börzel and Aron Buzogány, 
“Governing EU Accession in Transition Countries: The Role of Non-State Actors,” Acta Politica 45, no. 
1 (2010): 158–82; Tom Casier, “To Adopt or Not to Adopt: Explaining Selective Rule Transfer under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy,” Journal of European Integration 33, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 37–53, 
doi:10.1080/07036337.2010.526709. 
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preferences.30 Likewise, in Ukraine and in Moldova some progress has been observed 
as regards the early stages of launching reforms, but changes in many areas have 
remained selective and partial, much like in the MENA region where initial 
commitment to reform was only matched by their frustratingly limited 
implementation.31 
Despite the announced new approach of the EU towards its neighbouring countries, the 
‘new’ element therein is highly debatable with ‘less of the same’ describing the limited 
change in practice towards neighbouring countries and less funding disbursed to target 
countries.32  More specifically, Noutcheva attests little change in the ENP goals on 
mobility and migration, conflict management and economic development. Conversely, 
she identifies only a minor changes in democracy, described as ‘deep and sustainable’, 
and complimented with being a ‘universal value’ for the EU and neighbourhood 
countries33. Her analysis suggest that both the goals and instruments of the ENP before 
and after the Arab Spring identifies a growing gap in the rhetorical and factual 
commitment to the promotion of democracy (as well as on sanctioning relapse), despite 
growing emphasis on diplomatic involvement of the EU in its neighbourhood.34 The 
emphasis on ongoing political reform as a precondition for economic support has been 
embedded in the ‘more-for-more’ approach introduced in 2011 that has sought to 
strengthen democratic governance and entrench democratisation processes across 
European neighbourhood countries. 35  But while on the practical level, the EU has 
modified policies towards non-members several times, some observers have claimed 
that the lessons of the Arab Spring have been the driving force behind this, rather than 
of past experiences with Europeanisation36. 
As in Noutcheva’s work37, much of the criticism expressed by the scholarship on 
Europeanisation, however, has come from those who demonstrate the lack of fit 
between candidate states’ abilities to live up to the requirements of reform as projected 
from the EU, and the EU’s own commitment to reward states’ successful 
                                                 
30 Esther Ademmer and Tanja A. Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 4 (June 1, 2013): 582, 
doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.766038; Tanja A. Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk, “Pathologies of 
Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 
(January 1, 2012): 80, doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.631315. 
31 Casier, “To Adopt or Not to Adopt.” 
32 Bicchi, “The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring.” 
33 Gergana Noutcheva, “Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the Wake of the 
Arab Spring,” Journal of European Integration 37, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 27–29, 
doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.975987. 
34 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and 
beyond EU Accession,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 842–60; Schimmelfennig 
and Scholtz, “Legacies and Leverage.” 
35 Daniel Silander and Martin Nilsson, “Democratization without Enlargement? The European 
Neighbourhood Policy on Post-Communist Transitions,” Contemporary Politics 19, no. 4 (December 1, 
2013): 448, doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.835115. 
36 Michael Emerson, “Just Good Friends? The European Union’s Multiple Neighbourhood Policies,” The 
International Spectator 46, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 51, doi:10.1080/03932729.2011.628091. 
37 Noutcheva, “Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the Wake of the Arab 
Spring.” 
 10	
implementation of it.38 The lack of a parsimoniously defined – or indeed, an agreed 
upon notion of what European norms should do, not to mention what they are – have 
added an extra level of difficulty when outlining the potential impacts of the ENP on 
target states. As Melo notes, the ENP is ‘neither enlargement, nor foreign policy’ and as 
such does not possess instruments or leverage vis-à-vis target countries.39 Therefore, 
despite its distinct position among the sets of European initiatives, the ENP has been 
thought of – and indeed written about – as a part of the EU’s enlargement process, 
assessed in terms of its efficiency to promote change in the neighbourhood. This has 
been dissected into different dimensions in the scholarship since the evolution of the 
differentiated approaches to ENP countries, such as the Black Sea Synergy in 2008 and 
the Eastern Partnership in 2009. 
Regrettably, we are unable to find realist accounts of reasons for the EU’s own over-
ambitious priorities in a range of issue areas (such as e.g. democracy promotion), or of 
the weakness of domestic embrace of the external norms. Equally, while the tensions 
between the EU and member-states about joint ownership of policy developments have 
been readily identified in research, there has been little written on joint actions to 
overcome the asymmetrical design of such policies such as the ENP, largely because of 
a difference of ambitions among ENP countries, as well as because of powerful tools in 
the hands of the Commission to offer all the benefits bar formal membership status to 
countries like Ukraine and Turkey.  
Considering the horizons for research on the ENP, scholars have focussed on processes 
inside and outside the EU to converge largely on the positive outcomes achieved. This 
is done in variety of ways. For example, when one adopts a more comprehensive 
outlook for exploring changes in ENCs under the pressure of the so-called illiberal 
regional heavyweights like Russia and China, societal factors are increasingly drawn 
into the explanatory matrix. This adds rather than reduces the complexity of 
explanation.40 At the same time, the role of wider sets of dependencies is such that 
embeddedness in global economies and reliance on aid41, tutelage by the international 
financial donors42 and the restrictive oversight by the Council of Europe (CoE) and 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)43 have all been added to 
the list of explanatory factors.  
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These studies underscore that global issues are at work in countries that are undergoing 
the process of Europeanisation, yet whether changes are the result of, or indeed 
exclusive to Europeanisation has not been addressed systematically. The studies cited 
all build upon the earlier findings on country- and/or sector-related conditions that allow 
transgovernmental policy networks to maintain resilience in the light of external 
pressures 44 , but whether these networks operate thanks to – or maybe despite – 
Europeanisation is less clear. As we have outlined above, we believe many of the ideas 
in the research are indebted to earlier debates on the role of ‘domestic factors’ forming 
the preferences of governments in European neighbouring states 45 , policy-specific 
conditionality46, impact of liberalization on political stability47 and the effectiveness of 
externally set provisions for domestic actors 48 . Scholarly attention during and 
immediately after the Eastern enlargement has postulated rather than synthesised 
knowledge on the impact of European factors on (new) member states:49 The fact that 
this notional impact is still labelled ‘Europeanisation’ is largely due to differences in the 
outcomes of domestic political process and policymaking across the set of countries. 
Exploring the impact of Europeanisation on domestic change, therefore, lacks 
sequential theorising on the reasons for difference, as well as on the mechanics of 
Europeanisation. Much of the scholarship agrees that during the period of Eastern 
enlargement two explanations have been useful to outline pathways in domestic change: 
One positing the rational choice of political actors in accession states who have been 
enticed to change now in exchange for benefits later, and another placing political 
institutions into a prominent position to steer change into the direction perceived to be 
appropriate and necessary. Not only have these two explanations emphasized the pivotal 
role of different actors (political elites respectively political institutions), but also the 
sustainability of political change (superficial respectively deep). They also have 
variegated explanations of domestic buy-in, thus ensuring the irreversibility of 
Europeanisation. 
In fact these two explanations for the different paths of Europeanisation tail back to the 
differential impact of the EU on political institutions which have been widely explored 
in the first-generation literature that focussed on member-states’ Europeanisation. The 
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Eastern enlargement Europeanisation scholars on the other hand have systematically 
marginalised an institutions-focussed perspective. Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) provided a laboratory for scholars to explore the short-term impact 
of external pressures – or conditionality – in candidate states and as such welcomed 
rational choice models for explanation. In the context of state-building and societies 
undergoing consolidation around the newly erected institutions of the state, it did make 
sense to treat political entrepreneurs as strategically-driven and goal-oriented actors. 
These credibly appeared to be rational utility maximisers for their constituencies given 
the situation and their shared preference for EU accession.50 
The institutionalist perspective put forward by Cowles et al therefore was a hard sell 
from the start:51 The emphasis on the impact domestic institutions have on political 
actors’ preference formation had invited re-thinking of Europeanisation as a process of 
social learning about the appropriate and ‘proper, i.e. a socially accepted behaviour in a 
given situation.’52 But placing the focus of analysis on European norms, values and 
identities as structural constraints, system changing factors were as difficult to pin down 
then as it is now. No wonder, therefore, that the project of seeing Europeanisation as a 
process of comprehensive social and political learning in the context of changing 
political institutions would have required studying social as well as political processes. 
Rather than perusing a narrow-gauge analysis of policy change, this type of 
Europeanisation research would have placed the emphasis on the emergence of new 
norms, ideas and collective understandings in the established institutional context 
followed by norm internalization and the development of new identities via 
socialization and social learning.53 
Scoping sets of responses by political entrepreneurs to expectations of external (i.e. 
European) actors appeared, therefore, a much more straightforward, though laborious 
task. This rational choice perspective on Europeanisation via sets of policy changes has 
offered a parsimonious account of changes in the horizon of opportunity with few 
immediate constraints on actors’ choices. Börzel and Risse54, for example, emphasised 
opportunities over constraints in the process of re-allocation of resources, leading to the 
differential empowerment of actors at the domestic level. Only later has Börzel 55 
inserted a critical corrective as to the role of factors influencing the desired outcomes, 
including multiple veto points and mediating formal (i.e. political) institutions that 
would constrain adaptation processes to the externally set expectations as perceived by 
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domestic actors.  
It is in this context that the buzzword ‘goodness of fit’ came in as a necessary condition 
for thinking about domestic change as a result of (and exposure to) Europeanisation.56 
Most of the research dealing with Europeanisation has been facing this common threat 
with caution: although a degree of ‘misfit’ is necessary for Europeanisation to be 
effective domestically, the measurement and assessment of difference between 
European and domestic policies, processes, and expectations have been hard to 
benchmark. Regardless of this, the ‘goodness of fit’ between the European and domestic 
levels determined the set of factors which could be studied to ascertain change.57 
However, the failure to identify the objects and subject of changes, as well as the lack of 
engagement with the notion of political change in this earlier literature on 
Europeanisation has hampered its own progress. The emphasis on rational choice on 
momentous processes resulted in the over-reliance of Europeanisation research on the 
analysis of political entrepreneurs’ choices that matched the goals they shared with their 
electorates (EU membership at all costs). It has removed political institutions – and as 
such, sociological institutionalism – from systematic accounts of domestic change that 
have been labelled ‘top-down Europeanisation’, merely focussing on the impact of 
(variously defined) European actors on weak and largely unconsolidated candidate and 
later neighbouring states.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the development of the Europeanisation scholarship has been 
marred by comparisons of the tentative outcomes of EU-driven, top-down processes 
that are only notionally useful to analytically benchmark processes not yet complete. 
We believe, therefore, that the weakness of the Europeanisation scholarship in relation 
to accession and ENP states has been due to scholars’ reluctance to engage with the 
fundamental notion of political change in the region exposed to Europeanisation 
(however one chooses to define it). Essentially conceived, European institutions are 
viewed as agents of political change in target countries, yet much of the scholarship 
cited above is complacent in viewing European institutions either as a homogenous 
actor/s, or as sets of overlapping European institutional initiatives that have a joint 
agenda by virtue of sharing agency. In so doing, it appears, Europeanisation research 
has been subverting coherent understandings about the EU’s own commitment to the 
norms and values it preaches. This is largely due to the fact, as we shall discuss below, 
that Europeanisation research is in fact little more than research on Europeanisation 
discourse, not on the change in the name of ‘Europe’.  
 
Europeanisation research after the Europeanisation process 
There is a clear sense of optimism in much of the debate in the Europeanisation 
scholarship that the changing focus from a set of Member-States to sets of Candidate 
Countries and later to Neighbourhood Countries will allow continuous discussion of the 
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EU’s impact on target countries. Yet as EU conditionality has become a much weaker 
driver of domestic change in the Western Balkans and Turkey over the past decade, how 
much room is there left for optimism?  
Although the EU has retained its superior bargaining power by which it could entice 
and rationalise domestic change in exchange for credible benefits, there is also a shared 
view of enlargement fatigue. The EU’s willingness to accept new member states is, 
according to explanations found in the literature, limited in part by its own credibility to 
impose sanctions on countries insufficiently prepared for membership, or by the EU 
itself delaying the progress on the acquis.58 Increasingly, scholarly voices have emerged 
suggesting that the EU’s capacity to deliver the ‘ultimate reward of membership’ at low 
cost to the current candidate states is disappearing rapidly.59 This is further compounded 
by the extension of membership criteria beyond the narrow scope of those outlined in 
the Copenhagen criteria and more stringent monitoring for the current candidate states 
on these past and new requirements. In the accession process of the Western Balkan 
states and Turkey, the EU has stressed the absorption capacity of domestic polities and 
the acquiescence of the European public.60 Tocci emphasizes that in the case of Turkey, 
country-specific issues have mutated into ‘informal conditions’ for membership: the 
size and growth of country’s population are in no way related to the Copenhagen 
criteria and/or the new criteria regarding the rule of law.61 Similarly, issues related to 
peace-building, regional cooperation, and security sector reforms have increasingly 
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been prioritized; meanwhile, the security dimension has been added as a criterion 
specific to Western Balkans.62 
Therefore, unlike the accession process of postcommunist Eastern European states, the 
cases of the Western Balkans and Turkey allow us to refocus on the essentials of the EU 
accession process. Yet again, whereas past work on Europeanisation has underlined the 
rational choice of domestic political entrepreneurs, we believe that domestic 
institutional designs should take centre stage in the analyses of Europeanisation 
processes in the Western Balkans and Turkey.63 Factors such as governments’ ability to 
circumvent legally entrenched legal norms, the perils of state weakness and ‘limited 
statehood’ are all a reflection of the recent scholarship on hampered domestic change in 
these states.64 
We should take research on Turkey as an indicative case for demonstrating the deficits 
of Europeanisation research at large, and miscalculations of the rational choice 
perspectives about the (anticipated) effects of EU conditionality more specifically. 
Since the importance of the EU accession has been diminishing for Turkey, we should 
have seen not only the effects of conditionality dwindle, but also an increasing 
mismatch between European and Turkish domestic policy outputs, political throughputs 
and normative inputs. However, before July’s failed coup, what some refer to as 
‘Europeanisation’ seemed to remain emotive, and as such inconsistent and selective.65 
Thus the direction of change in Turkey’s domestic political landscape and the revisions 
to its political institutions conducted as a result President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s new 
mandate will provide empirical detail for scholars to test existing explanations of 
domestic change. There is certainly a wealth of studies with which to engage. On the 
one hand, much research draws attention to domestic elites as actors — rather than 
mediators — of Europeanisation, 66  being ineptly involved in the formation of 
government preferences67, social movements68 , incentives for and strategies of the 
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political elites69, the strategic use of appeals to the EU70 and policy entrepreneurship71. 
On the other hand, the adverse consequences of the Europeanisation process in relation 
to freedom of expression72, the rule of law73, and for politically mobilized civil society74 
should highlight the effective role of European involvement in mediating, if not steering 
domestic institutional developments.  
The Western Balkans constitutes another ‘borderline case’ of Europeanisation since the 
targeted states in the region do not have the necessary capacity for the EU’s 
transformative power to effectively drive reforms.75 Domestic conditions, such as  state 
capacity, unsettled borders, strong clientelism of political elites, and entrenched elites 
have all been a part of the scholarship on Europeanisation of the region.76 These studies 
have all been pointing to the role domestic institutions play in effective engagement 
with the sets of European norms, regulations and policies. It is our contention that this 
should be taken more seriously in the future. Many political institutional structures in 
the Western Balkans have been extremely unfavourable for domestic political as well as 
social change, and as such have driven research on Europeanisation of the region into 
the doldrums. This is unlikely to change, as the involvement of international institutions 
in state-building across the Western Balkans is likely to slide further down the European 
agenda. But as we have outlined above, it is the focus on the short-term rationality of 
actors on the ground who implement politics that has been at the centre of research on 
Europeanisation. Far too little attention has been paid to political institutions already in 
place to facilitate those actors’ choices of and successful implementation of policies 
delegated from the EU down. Most importantly, we believe that the cases of the 
Western Balkan states now indicate that ‘Europeanisation’ as a political project and also 
as a scholarly set of discursive projects by political entrepreneurs requires a revision to 
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maintain momentum.  
Over the past decade the focus of research has been on the limits of the EU’s 
transformative power to effectuate change in the region, connected to a concern with  
domestic actors in the process of enlargement conditionality. As we argue, however,  
more importance should be granted to the pivotal role domestic institutions play in the 
background for the process. The case of Turkey provides just one such insightful point 
for revision: Aydin-Düzgit discusses how Europeanisation operates in the area of 
discourse on political change and spills over onto both societies and political elites’ 
expectations of the efficacy of the state.77 Far from drumming up concerns about the 
‘nasty consequences of Europeanisation’, we can therefore conclude that much of the 
literature on the impact of Europeanisation has dealt implicitly with discourses on the 
potential, as opposed to actual impact which EU membership would offer for domestic 
political entrepreneurs to exploit weaknesses of barely consolidated democratic 
institutions to their own advantage.  
Little wonder, therefore, that the Europeanisation literature still encounters areas for 
further research: Patchy theorising on cause and effect in domestic change particularly 
requires more systematic empirical datasets, not only on countries (such as old member-
states), but also on entire regions (e.g. Southern Caucasus); a lack of agreement on the 
empirical remit of the concept itself opens up leeway for scholarship on ‘reverse 
Europeanisation’ and normative bias in assessment invites discussions on the so-called 
‘adverse consequences’ of Europeanisation. Overall, however, the repeated references 
to processes, whereas in fact outcomes are being studied further compromises the 
explanatory value of Europeanisation debates and crucially the lifetime of descriptive 
scholarship produced.  
 
Instead of conclusion: Whither Europeanisation research?  
Let us therefore finally unpack the meanings invested into ‘Europeanisation’ as a tool 
for analyses. Since Schmidt and Radaelli's work, it has been clear that two perspectives 
on Europeanisation exist: one focuses on it as a process, while the other treats 
Europeanisation as sets of top-down outcomes by different, in part overlapping 
European organisations focussed on the nation-state78. Indeed, the considerable bulk of 
the literature has used ‘Europeanisation’ as a short-hand term for the top-down impact 
of the EU on domestic politics, polity and policy. This has largely been due to the 
influential top-down, unidirectional view of the process as advocated by Radaelli, 
Schimmelfennig, and Sedelmeier.79 Yet, with the EU in multiple crises and the ability 
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of the European centre to advise, pressure and oversee domestic change in tatters, there 
are limits to the helpfulness of any established analytical tool in a top-down 
understanding of Europeanisation. In our paper we have considered these 
aforementioned problematic legacies of the scholarship on Europeanisation and 
explored the potential available in the use of the concept for analyses of processes of 
social and political change across the wider European region. There are still many 
issues left to ‘talk the talk’ of Europeanisation. 
Our interim assessment of the scholarship on Europeanisation, however, is pessimistic: 
we believe that in order to expand the theoretical toolbox on Europeanisation, we ought 
to untangle past research findings on policy changes conducted from a normative 
standpoint from those engaging in analyses of a narrower scope, especially functional 
changes on the interface of the politics and societies affected. It is in this context that we 
attest that particularly the scholarship on Europeanisation as a one-way road to Brussels 
has reached a dead-end. At the same time, those referencing Europeanisation as a 
horizon of opportunity for statecraft have been under-explored and offer much needed 
leeway for empirical studies.  
The main claim of this paper has been that whereas the use of the concept in past 
research has been extremely effective in focussing on outcomes not on processes, it has 
profited from a lack of epistemic clarity about how Europeanisation works and 
capitalised on an ontological fuzziness of what Europeanisation is. There remain, 
therefore, some considerable lessons to learn from the past scholarship. Despite our 
overall pessimism in our assessment on the work of Europeanisation to date, we believe 
that more can be gained from an understanding of Europeanisation as a peer-to-peer 
learning dynamic, as well as by disengaging from overtly normative accounts of 
Europeanisation’s unidirectional impacts on member, candidate and neighbourhood 
states.  
Neither should the scholarship on Europeanisation as a process be laid to rest. 
Regardless of widely held concerns about the fate of the EU itself, its enlargement 
and/or coherence of the European normative space conjured particularly as a result of 
the momentous Brexit vote in the UK, Europeanisation as a tool of analyses bears some 
considerable value for explaining sets of political, social, economic and not least 
cultural processes across the wider European space. If only it was applied 
systematically, it would also gain unprecedented heuristic value to tap not only 
processes of political and economic change, but also broader social transformations in 
the region.  
So far, this spectrum in Europeanisation research has provided scholars a range of 
issues to explore dynamics of either Europeanisation, but also increasingly de-
Europeanisation as part of strategic use of unconsolidated institutions by utility 
maximising political entrepreneurs. In the end, such developments signify the need for 
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further scholarly attention to the role played by political institutions in new and old, 
candidate and accession states as well as in neighbourhood states all striving to 
consolidate their domestic political regimes in the light of perceived or real pressures 
from European institutions. 
